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Image of the Wehrmacht in Federal German Society 





 The collapse of the Soviet civil-military system in 1989-91 has led to the 
enlargement of Euro-Atlantic democratic civil-military relations and military 
professionalism into central and eastern Europe.2  Since 1990, this process has 
featured prominently in the reform of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
whose “Partnership for Peace” has emphasized the need to place political ideals 
of security, defense and military service on a democratic footing in the sphere 
beyond the Elbe, Danube, Moldau and Vistula.  Many participants in, and 
observers of, this process have tended to treat these events as sui generis, that is, 
as essentially being without precedent.  While the details and certain key aspects 
of how the central and eastern Europeans have junked the Soviet system of civil-
military relations have been surely unique, the collapse of regimes and the re-
orientation of civil-military fundamentals recalls how episodes of military reform 
have unfolded in the European past.  Since Niccolo Machiavelli’s proposals in 
                                                 
1
 The research for this essay was generously supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
whom this author wishes to thank.  The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not 
represent those of the U.S. Government. 
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 See: NATO Office of Information and Press, eds.   NATO Handbook: 50th Anniversary ed.  (Brussels, 
1998), pp. 59ff; Jeffrey Simon,  NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military 
Relations, (Washington, 1996); Donald Abenheim, “The German Soldier and National Unity,” in After the 
Wall: Eastern Germany since 1989, Patricia J. Smith ed. (Boulder/Oxford, 1998), pp. 257-279. 
 2
the fifteenth century to re-organize the army of Florence, military reform has 
been more or less a constant feature of modern European history.3  
 No where has this generalization been more true than in the record of the 
soldier and the state in Prussian-German history.4  Such reforms began with the 
Hohenzollern Great Elector’s reform of the Prussian army in the wake of the 
Thirty Years’ War and continued through three centuries until German 
unification in 1990.  However, the fate of German soldiers in the wake of defeat 
in 1918, the union of such soldiers and national socialism and the impact of the 
Second World War upon German society remain especially prominent in this 
respect.5  The fate of the soldier in state in the era 1914-45 has formed an object of 
civil-military debate in German society from war’s end in 1918-19 until this 
writing in the final months of the 20th century.   
 The present work concentrates on an aspect of the above, namely the 
manner in which the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany have dealt with 
the symbolic and professional legacies of defeat in the past half century.  This 
misunderstood subject commends itself to further reflection and analysis in an 
                                                 
3
 For instance, see Hans Delbrueck, Die Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte,  
4 vols. (Berlin, 1920ff.); Michael Howard, War in European History  (Oxford, 1976); Peter Paret, 
Clausewitz and the State (New York/Oxford, 1976); John L. Lynn, ed.  Tools of War: Instruments: Ideas 
and Institutions, 1400-1871 (Urbana/Chicago, 1990).  
4
 See: Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945  (New York/Oxford, 1964); Gerhard 
Papke, et al eds.  Handbuch zur deutschen Militaergeschichte, 1648-1939,  6vols. (Munich, 1979); Karl 
Volker Neugebauer, ed.  Gruendzuege der deutschen Militaergeschichte,  2 vols. (Freiburg, 1993). 
5
  Among a vast literature, see, for instance:  Hans-Juergen Mueller,  Das Heer und Hitler:  Armee und NS 
Regime,  2d. ed. (Munich, 1988);  Omer Bartov,  Hitler’s Army:  Soldiers, Nazis and War in the 3d Reich  
(Oxford/New York,  1991);  Hans-Guenther Thiele, ed.  Die Wehrmachtausstellung: Dokumentation einer 
Kontroverse  (Bremen, 1997); Heribert Prantl, ed.  Wehrmachtsverbrechen:  eine deutsche Kontroverse  
(Hamburg, 1997); Hans Poeppel, et al. eds.  Die Soldaten der Wehrmacht   (Munich, 1998); 
Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt eds.  Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realitaet (Munich, 1999).  A 
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English-speaking world, which remains more transfixed upon the causes and 
course of the two world wars than on their effects on the latter half of the 
century.  This story also suggests itself to students of civil-military reform across 
the face of the globe interested in the impact of images of the past upon 
contemporary civil-military debate since all must to some degree deal with the 
legacies of the past in which the images of the armed forces are often extremely 
politicized.  
 In view of the long and fundamental importance of the military in 
Germany, its entry into war and defeat twice in the century under very different 
situations in civil-military relations, and the long and ongoing debate about the 
position of the military in society, there should be conclusions or “lessons” that 
are relevant for most new democracies.  While we are indeed aware that all 
countries have unique challenges and thus the responses must also be unique, 
the case of how Germany deals with its military legacy, and particularly the 
definition of the professional soldier, is so rich and complex that we are 
convinced that scholars and decision makers throughout the world will find 
much of relevance in the pages that follow.  The mere fact that there is a debate 
in Germany may encourage others to also debate their military legacies which in 
many cases are publicly ignored to fester until a political crisis brings them to a 
head, often with disastrous results. 
                                                                                                                                                 
journalistic treatment of the soldier in national socialism is from a television series,  Guido Knopp et al,  
Hitlers Krieger  (Munich, 1998). 
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 The unexpected success of democracy in Germany over the past half 
century has had an important civil-military component that is often overlooked 
by those unfamiliar with German politics and society since 1949.  This civil-
military aspect is reflected in how political and cultural elites in the FRG have 
thought about and acted upon the respective experiences of Germany’s bid for 
world power, its defeat in 1918, the failed republic, the Nazi regime, and yet 
another, more horrible lost war.  This process is closely linked to the idea of 
“coming to grips with the past,” that is, the ethical, cultural, and above all 
intellectual-political reflection about past events and how such thought manifests 
itself in civil-military institutions and policy.  The following pages interpret a 
little known debate within Germany about the nature of military professionalism 
and democracy in the wake of defeat, the rise of the Cold War, and the changing 
international and domestic-political aspects of Federal German civil-military 
relations.  
  
Old Photographs And Old Questions Posed Anew 
 What images of word and film best capture the legacy of the Wehrmacht 
(German armed forces) in the Federal Republic?  Is it the amputee in a dyed field 
blouse and cap making his way on crutches amid the rubble?6  Could it be scenes 
circa 1946 of the senior military leadership on trial at Nuremberg?; or, of the last 
                                                 
6
 See:  Klaus Honnef et al eds.  Ende und Anfang: Photographen in Deutschland um 1945  (Berlin, 1995); 
Dagmar Barnouw,  Germany, 1945:  Views of War and Violence  (Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1996); Karl 
Hoche,  In diesem unserem Haus:  eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik in ihren Bildern  
(Duesseldorf/Zuerich, 1996).  
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prisoners of war returning to Germany after their release from Soviet camps in 
1955?; or the novelist Hans-Hellmut Kirst’s depiction of barracks square brutality 
and farce in the novels Null Acht Fuenfzehn?; or of the dramatist Carl 
Zuckmayer’s portrait of the air ace Ernst Udet’s undoing in Des Teufels General?  
Perhaps, some would choose the thrilling depictions of soldierly bravery and the 
technical mastery of the military art with Stukas on high and Panthers on the 
attack found in the illustrated veterans’ magazine, Der Frontsoldat Erzaehlt? 
 While any one of these images might offer a point of departure, this essay 
begins with a reflection on a collection of photographs from the Second World 
War that, in the present decade, has aroused bitter emotions in contemporary 
politics.7  A studio portrait of an un-named young German soldier in his 
walking-out uniform contrasts with snap-shots of an execution somewhere in the 
rear area of the eastern front.  In the former image, a young man in peaked cap 
and walking-out dress fixes his gaze purposefully beyond the portrait camera’s 
lens.  The second image reveals a group of German military and non-military 
personnel, as well as Russian civilians, transfixed by the shattered corpses that 
swing from the hangman’s noose.  The juxtaposition of images confronts the 
present with the dilemma of how German soldiers did or did not cross the ethical 
and professional frontier that separates a disciplined, regular army from 
becoming perpetrators of mass slaughter for genocidal purposes.  The storm of 
                                                 
7
 Hanes Heer et al eds.  Vernichtungskrieg:  Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944   (Hamburg, 1995), pp. 
xiv-xv. This is the edition of essays to supplement the catalogue of the Wehrmacht exhibition staged by the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research. This exhibition became a source of civil-military controversy after 
1995.  
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ideological mass violence that swept this recruit from the photo atelier to the 
front and which, in all likelihood, brought death to him and to the victims of the 
executioner has left behind great wreckage to the present day.  The after-effects 
of this tempest have compelled those who survived as well as their heirs to 
consider the dilemma of how the second German democracy dealt with the 
legacy of national socialism and how the Federal Republic sought to reconcile 
military professionalism with the disasters of mass politics and the soldierly 
ethos.  The debate that began in the mid-1990s about the so-called Wehrmacht 
exhibition represents the most recent episode in a long-standing process of 
coming to grips with the past as concerns these issues.8  At various times since 
1949, civilians and soldiers have addressed the image of the Wehrmacht in 
Federal German society in connection with the transformation of the 
international system of states and the changing complexion of domestic society.  
In particular, the debate about the valid heritage of the Bundeswehr (Federal 
German Armed Forces) forms but a subsidiary phenomenon of a general political 
and social self-examination of the past in German society that has burst forth 
with new energy since the European collapse of the communist system a decade 
ago.9 
                                                 
8
  See sources on exhibition also in note 5, above.  
9
  See two German works:  Ulrich Brochhagen,  Nach Nuremberg: Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung und 
Westintegration in der Aera Adenauer  (Hamburg, 1994); Norbert Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik:  Die 
Anfaenge der Bundesrepublik und die NS Vergangenheit (Munich, 1996).  On the general issue of society, 
culture, mentality and the legacy of war, see: Hermann Glaser,  Kulturgeschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 3 vols. (Munich/Vienna, 1985); on these issues in society, politics and ideas  as they pertain to 
scholarly elites until 1989, see: Charles Maier,  The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German 
National Identity (Cambridge/London, 1988).  Glaser updated his work as  Deutsche Kultur, 1945-2000  
(Munich/Vienna, 1997).     
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Continuities Of Democracy And Military Professionalism: The Political And 
Social Setting In The Beginning Of Debate, 1945-49 
 
 These elements of continuity in the struggle to extract historical truth 
about the soldier in national socialism follow quite naturally from the evolution 
of military professionalism and from the consolidation of democracy in modern 
Europe.  Such issues concern more than merely central Europe; however, as such 
historians as Klaus Juergen Mueller and Michael Geyer have suggested,10 in the 
first half of the 20th century the failures of democracy, mass politics and the 
soldierly calling brought disastrous consequences for soldier and civilian alike.  
Thus, this story stands within the frame of 20th century civil-military relations as 
much as it does within contemporary German history. Germans have 
consistently used the unceasing debate about image of the Wehrmacht as a 
means to address more general civil-military issues in politics and society.11  
 Furthermore, any understanding of the legacy of the Wehrmacht in 
Federal Germany exists in connection with the evolution of 
Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung (mastery of the past) as a general political and 
social phenomenon amid the changing character of German democracy.  The 
early phase of this phenomenon has recently been given an insightful treatment 
by Norbert Frei, who suggests that the founders of the early Federal Republic, 
                                                 
10
 Klaus-Juergen Mueller,  Armee und Drittes Reich, 1933-1939  (Paderborn, 1989); Michael Geyer,  
“German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945,” in Peter Paret ed.  Makers of Modern 
Strategy,   2d ed. (Princeton, 1986) pp. 527-597. 
11
 These issues as they pertain to the era 1950-1986 are developed in this author’s Reforging the Iron Cross 
(Princeton, 1988). 
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rather than simply tolerating a restoration of the worst of clapped-out Weimar 
functionaries and Nazi fellow travelers, sought to fashion a workable policy of 
democratic integration from the civil-military mistakes of 1918-45 and from the 
political and social exigencies of the moment.12  One need only recall how 
Germany between 1919 and 1933 had suffered from catastrophic civil-military 
relations and the rise of ideological camps within the body politic that grew more 
balkanized and antagonistic as time passed.  The effort after 1948 to correct the 
failings of the first republic by a policy of democratic inclusion emerged amid the 
stresses of the first years of the Cold War and sparked opposition and 
controversy from the outset among those who worried about a neo-Nazi and 
militarist revival.  Under the eyes of the occupiers, the makers of policy in the 
young democracy in Bonn confronted a disastrous situation of physical ruin and 
general bitterness for which no easy answers seemed possible.  The failure of 
republican forces after 1921 to raise an army-in-a-democracy stood as a warning 
that a failure to reconcile soldiers with the new Basic Law would surely have 
fatal consequences. 13 
 The Federal Republic had to do several things at once with the millions of 
veterans of the Wehrmacht as concerned:  a) their democratic integration; b) their 
enfranchisement in society; and c) the provision of social welfare that had been 
forbidden by the occupiers’ doctrines of control.  In the first instance, as Frei 
                                                 
12
 Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  pp.25ff.  
13
  For the political radicalization of veterans groups in the era 1919-1933, see, for instance, Volker 
Berghahn,  Der Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten  (Duesseldorf, 1966); James Diehl,  Paramilitary Politics 
in the Weimar Republic  (Bloomington/London, 1977).  
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notes, the government had to distance itself from the ongoing attempt by the 
victors to re-educate, to de-nazify and to punish millions of Germans, among 
whom were tens of thousands of professional soldiers.  The occupiers’ project to 
mount an educational and psychological reform directed at all younger 
Germans, as well as to purge millions of party members from public life and civil 
society had reached its climax in the general attempt to punish the worst 
perpetrators of the regime at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and 
its subsequent trials.14  Soldiers figured prominently as defendants in these trials.  
Military officers received damnation, scorn, and reproach for the failures of the 
regime and for defeat in war; plainly such sentiments affected rather less the 
common soldier, who at the time might be thought to be as much as a victim of 
the regime as the actual political/racial victims themselves.  The offensive 
strategy of de-militarization, de-nazification, de-cartelization and 
democratization and of collective guilt had generally passed the culminating 
point by the time the FRG was born in the spring of 1949.  The broad sweep of 
such strategy called forth a wave of public resentment against the victors and 
against their methods that had worrisome dimensions.  The radical right-wing 
literary figure of the Weimar period, Ernst von Salomon, whose novel of the 
early 1950s, Der Fragebogen represents but a notable literary example of this 
phenomenon.15    
 
                                                 
14
 Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik, pp. 133ff. 
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Two Images Of The Wehrmacht In Politics And Society, 1949-55 
 
 Thus emerged at the outset the two antagonistic images of the 
Wehrmacht, which simultaneously form central continuities within this process 
of historical examination:  a) the Wehrmacht as a semi-criminal or criminal 
organization, replete with a highly compromised senior leadership and a suspect 
officers corps; on the other hand, there rose as a reaction to this image; b) the 
military as a reservoir of Prussian-German patriotic, soldierly professional 
virtues that in certain key aspects had not been wholly corrupted by the national 
socialist regime.  Indeed, the army had, at a crucial moment, offered the most 
significant resistance to the Nazis possible in July 1944.  While the foregoing 
surely contains elements of oversimplification, this bi-polarity is useful for 
analysis. The continuities associated with these conflicted images have endured 
in one form or another into the present.16 
  The image of the Wehrmacht as a semi-criminal organization forms the 
point of departure. From the outset in the years from 1945 until 1949, 
professional soldiers stood, singled out, alongside the party hacks, for having 
brought defeat to eighty million Germans after prolonging a needless war.  
Despite the propaganda of the defunct regime to the contrary, the vaunted 
professional genius of German soldiers seemed to fail them utterly after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15
 See the US translation of same as:  Ernst von Salomon, Der Fragebogen (Questionnaire)  (New York, 
1955). 
16
 These ideas are developed in this author’s Reforging the Iron Cross, pp.11ff., which in turn, relies on 
Hans Speier,  German Rearmament and Atomic War   (Evanston/White Plains, 1957)  which still repays  
reading.  Useful on this account from the end of the 1990s is Wolfram Wette, “Das Bild der Wehrmacht 
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blush of victory had vanished in 1941.  Similarly the cult of soldierly tradition 
with its antiquated adherence to semi-feudal ideals of obedience, had grown 
perverted in the hands of genocidal mass murders.  To be sure, professional 
soldiers in this period reaped a more bitter harvest of opprobrium than did say, 
scientists, lawyers, professors, doctors, judges, artists, and clerics, although each 
of these social groups had made common cause with the national socialists and 
committed professional misdeeds and crimes, as well.  Since national socialism 
had grossly inflated the traditional prestige of the soldier by means of an attempt 
early in the regime to erect the Third Reich upon the dual pillars of party and 
army, one might naturally expect a backlash against such policy.  Six of the 
regime’s twelve years had been during war-time in which the small cadre of 
officers who had sharpened their skills in the Reichswehr were dwarfed in the 
national socialist people-at-arms that the Wehrmacht became at the height of the 
war.  The radicalizing vortex of total war either snuffed out or swallowed up the 
lives of ever more Germans.  Once defeat was also total in 1944-45, professional 
soldiers formed an easy and logical target of the resentment, guilt, and anger of 
these millions.  One should note, however, in all of this that there ceased to be a 
unitary, monolithic Wehrmacht, if such a thing ever existed at all.  The 
experience of soldierly life, war, politics, and society varied among the millions 
affected so that one can only generalize about this institution, while, at the same 
time, taking into account numerous exceptions to such rules.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Elite nach 1945,” in Gerd Ueberschaer, ed.  Hitler’s Militaerische Elite, Vom Kriegsbeginn bis zum 
Weltkriegsende,  Vol. II, pp. 293-308.  
 12
 The consolidation of the contrarian image of the Wehrmacht as being 
something other than the damned of the Nuremberg prosecutors could only take 
hold slowly at first.  While the strictures of demilitarization held sway, few 
voices of dissent against this doctrine were to be heard, save from the defendants 
at the Nuremberg trials and from their lawyers and from those accused of war 
crimes in Landsberg prison.17  However, this silence in the face of the 
proscription of the Wehrmacht passed once the Cold War began to erode the 
imperatives of the Four “D’s” of occupation policy.  Such was the case soon after 
the FRG came into being in the spring of 1949 and the eruption of war in Korea 
in the summer of 1950 worsened greatly the character of the Soviet-American 
antagonism.  
  Whereas the dictates of demilitarization had led to a general prohibition 
on all things military, the recognition by the Adenauer government and by the 
NATO allies in 1949-50 that they would presently need to arm the Federal 
Republic within some kind of European army led to a liberalization of this 
soldierly ban.  Despite the vow that Germany should remain forever free of arms 
and armies, the congruent needs of German sovereignty and of alliance strategy 
required the armament of the Federal Republic in the face of general disbelief 
and hostility domestically and abroad.18 
                                                 
17
 For an example in the wake of the Nuremberg trials, see: Hans Laterrnser,  Verteidigung deutscher 
Soldaten:  Pladoyers vor Allierten Gerichten  (Bonn, 1950), also Wette, “Wehrmacht Elite,”;  Frei,  
Vergangenheitspolitik, pp. 133ff.  
18
 The best account of the armament of the Federal Republic and the first years of  the new German military 
is found in Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt, eds.  Anfaenge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik  
(Munich, 1982ff.)  4 vols.  Also see this author’s Reforging the Iron Cross,  pp.47ff. and the synoptic 
 13
 Thus followed a phase wherein veterans groups sprang into existence, the 
political right re-emerged in Germany, a handful of ex-Wehrmacht officers 
planned for a German contribution to Euro-Atlantic defense amid pacifist 
hostility, and memoirists and military pamphleteers produced a flood of 
literature on the last war of varying quality and purpose.  Herein did the 
contrarian answer to Nuremberg verdict and to re-education fully established 
itself from its sources in various quarters in German society.  Like so much else 
in German politics, the diverse adherents to the contrarian image of the 
Wehrmacht pursued overlapping goals while being united in their desire to 
cleanse the tarnished escutcheon of the soldier.  Those who have recently come to 
this problem would do well to keep this insight in mind.  
  In this connection, one can distinguish between:  a) those who defended 
the military in the past war to secure their own pensions;19 b) those who sought 
to reconstruct military professionalism on a democratic basis within the FRG and 
NATO;20 and c) those who, as in dark times past, grasped at the catalogue of 
military virtues and soldierly honor to shield their own actions or misdeeds, as 
well as d) those who employed personalities and institutions of military 
professionalism and valor as a symbol of radical right-wing politics.  Again, 
these categories might appear somewhat overdrawn for the sake of 
                                                                                                                                                 
overview in:  Hans-Martin Ottmer,  Die Entwicklung deutscher Sicherheitspolitik und die Geschichte der 
Bundeswehr, 1945-1992  (Bonn/Herford, 1992).  
19
 Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik,  pp. 69-99.  
20
 Abenheim,  Iron Cross,  pp.47ff.  On right-wing and radical right wing politics, see:  Adolf M. Birke,  Die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Verfassung, Parlament, Parteien  (Munich, 1997), pp.16ff; Rudolf Morsey,  
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1969 (Munich,  1987), pp.22ff, 173ff;  
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generalization, but such is necessary to differentiate how the image of the 
Wehrmacht has subsequently evolved over the past five decades.  
  The foregoing stands linked with a specific period of time that extends 
from the era of the Korean War (1950-53) until the rise of détente after the closing 
of the inner-German border and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961-63). This period is 
also significant as concerns the character of the mastery of the past in the FRG.  
These years witnessed certain culpable ex-Nazis seizing upon the Adenauer 
government’s policies of democratic inclusion to escape punishment within what 
the chancellor’s critics condemned as either a restoration or a general ethical and 
moral amnesia about past violence.  Such amnesia or numbness only began to 
give way with the stirrings of a more assertive, questioning German civil society 
in the ferment of the early 1960s.21  Within this first phase, then, one should 
consider how German soldiers in service after 1955 dealt with their own legacy 
and had to make their way between the bi-polarities of the images of the 
Wehrmacht in the FRG until the middle 1960s.     
 
Image Of The Wehrmacht In The Early Years Of The Bundeswehr: Cold War 
Caution, Inclusion And Contradiction, 1950-65 
 
 The military founders of the Bundeswehr were without exception 
veterans of the Wehrmacht; moreover certain of these figures had served in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Uwe Backes, et al eds.  Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin/Frankfurt, 
1993). 
21
 On these themes within West German politics and society generally, see: Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Aera 
Adenauer, 1949-1957; 1957-1963  in   Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,   vols. 2 & 3,  Theodor 
Eschenburg et al eds. (Munich, 1981).  
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old armies before 1918 and in the Reichswehr.22  Their military biographies 
comprised great moments of military professionalism and the subsequent 
decadence and corruption of soldierly ideals in the maelstrom of mass politics, 
total warfare in the machine age and pseudo-scientific ethnic cleansing.  They 
had participated in military deeds of enormous self-sacrifice and great soldierly 
skill and seen soldiers and civilians alike criminally abuse such sacrifice and 
expertise.  Further, many leading civilian political figures of the Adenauer era, 
who took a strong hand in the construction of the new army, had likewise served 
in uniform, mostly in the era 1933-45, although some had done so earlier as was 
the case with the socialist Kurt Schumacher.   
 Once makers of policy applied this collective experience to the task of 
simultaneously building a durable democracy and an efficient army, the result 
became visible, one might argue, as a kind of synthesis between the contrary, 
conflicted images of the Wehrmacht that had emerged in the era 1944-50.23  This 
synthesis was symbolized by the democratic civil-military reforms of the Basic 
Law (1954-57), by the body of laws affecting military service, and by the 
reformulation of the soldier’s ideals of service, command, morale and obedience 
that after 1953 became known as Innere Fuehrung.24   In the realm of the 
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international system, the joining of new German combat power to the integrated 
military structure of NATO within the ranks of former opponents and new allies 
represented a departure from past strategy and military practice.  The sum of 
these measures rejected the essence of the Wehrmacht in national socialism, even 
if critics at home and abroad believed in 1955 that NATO was hoisting Hitler’s 
officers back into the saddle with all the evil that might portend.  For their part, 
allied soldiers were quick to-forgive-and-forget.  Such a policy was obvious in 
Dwight Eisenhower’s statement of honor for the German soldier of 1951.  He 
offered this declaration upon becoming Supreme Commander Allied Forces, 
Europe to neutralize the opposition to alliance with the West that remained 
among many ex-soldiers embittered over their social ostracism, re-education and 
the Nuremberg and Landsberg verdicts.25  
 The civil-military reforms and democratic fundamentals of the 1950s, 
which arose, in part, from the clash of images over the Wehrmacht legacy, have 
proven far more effective and durable than one might have expected at the time.  
Four decades ago, however, all of this reform seemed but tentative and 
incomplete, and, because of the pre-1945 experience of soldier and the state, to be 
prone to a disastrous ending as in the era 1929-33. 
 The new civil-military ideal of the citizen-in-uniform could not disavow 
wholly the military careers of those who stood to arms to defend the FRG within 
the ranks of NATO.26  In addition to young men with no prior service, the first 
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officers of the Bundeswehr, who entered service in 1955-58, contained a strong 
contingent of company and field-grade veterans of the Wehrmacht.  The latter 
were acutely aware of their own military skill and self-sacrifice from 1939 to 
1945.  While the Bundeswehr emerged as an army-without-pathos and thus 
rejected the Wilhelmine and Nazi over-emphasis on symbols and ceremonies, 
soldiers still had a sense of their own honor and professional ethos despite all 
that had happened around them.  The Nazis in particular had taken the cult of 
soldierly tradition that became a political force after 1918, to fresh extremes.  
These measures began with Joseph Goebbels’ historical exaggeration and 
political manipulation of the 21 March 1933 opening of the Reichstag in Potsdam 
and ended in 1945 with the color extravaganza film of Prussian kamikaze virtues 
in Kolberg.  Such excesses would have no place in the West German military, but 
practical curbs on the cult of tradition did prove difficult to carry into effect.  Any 
honoring by the new army of the soldierly past would perhaps appear to critics 
of the Bundeswehr as signs of a militarist or neo-Nazi revival.  At the same time, 
however, men-at-arms would naturally honor their fallen comrades, respect their 
former commanders, exemplify such sacrifice, and, most important, avoid the 
blanket condemnations of the soldierly ethos that until recently had been the 
norm. 
 In response to the question of lineage, honors and the maintenance of 
tradition with the Wehrmacht, the Reichswehr and the old armies, the leadership 
of the Bundeswehr adopted a policy of “wait and see” amid the general attempt 
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at democratic civil-military relations.27  The chief concern of civilian and military 
proponents of change lay with the reformed institutions of command, morale 
and obedience, which had to solidify in the midst of a rapid, turbulent military 
build-up in the years of crisis from 1956 until 1963.  Within high councils of the 
civil and military leadership, as well as among the legislative and academic 
advisors to the Ministry of Defense, figures thought about a declaratory policy 
on military tradition.  The most intractable aspect of this issue remained the 
legacy of the Wehrmacht.  Contradictions and frictions on this account constantly 
thrust forward amid the enduring clash of the two conflicted images of the 
soldier in national socialism described above.  A statement of policy on military 
tradition only emerged many years later.  At the same time, though, senior 
defense decision makers had to raise new troop units under the gaze of impatient 
NATO allies; further, they had to adjust their ideas about strategy to 
thermonuclear combat, while they survived the Cold War crises from 1956 until 
1963 that allowed Germans but few options for survival and prosperity.   
 The policy on military tradition that slowly emerged in the beginning of 
the Bundeswehr filled the pantheon of the new army, such as it was, with the 
Prussian reformers of the era 1808-15, the men and women of the 20th of July 
1944, and the common soldiers of the Wehrmacht.  The latter were honorable 
because they fulfilled their duty to fight at the front out of patriotism and self-
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sacrifice and because one could hardly have excluded them without devastating 
consequences for needs of policy and strategy.28 
 Thus, within the system of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr adopted an 
image of the Wehrmacht and soldierly tradition that accorded generally with 
overall political and social trends of the time, but which also contained obvious 
contradictions that became more problematic as events moved on.  For instance, 
the deeds of the simple Landser and of the anti-Hitler general staff officers in the 
headquarters of the Replacement Army and of Army Group Center seemed 
difficult to reconcile in fact.  In its essence, however, such policy about the 
symbols, lineage, honors and traditions of the former German armies reflected 
the spirit of democratic inclusion and anti-Weimar-era enfranchisement that had 
marked the first Adenauer years.  The decree on soldierly tradition published by 
the Ministry of Defense in the summer of 1965 fits this generalization with its 
exemplification of a catalogue of soldierly virtues and of the Prussian reformers 
and the figures of the 20th of July.  Perhaps such policy was, in part, also beset by 
the amnesia that affected society at the time.  This latter question assumed a 
growing importance as the nature of state, politics and society changed not only 
in West Germany but also within the Euro-Atlantic world. 
 
The Negative Image Of The Wehrmacht Re-Emerges:  Causes And Effects, 
1963-82 
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 From the vantage point of century’s end, the forces, which transformed 
the subject at hand, were, in the main, already present in the waning years of the 
Adenauer cabinet (1959-63) and those of Ludwig Erhard (1963-66).29  Such factors 
of mentality, politics, and society undermined the contrarian image of the 
Wehrmacht that arose in the years 1949-63 and, eventually, allowed for a revival, 
wholly or in part, of the image of semi-criminal Wehrmacht.  The latter has 
become a dominant feature of debate on the subject from the middle 1970s until 
the end of the 1990s.  In this regard, there exists also throughout this period a 
noteworthy connection between the image of contemporary history in Germany, 
international events and domestic political change.30  
  The international system passed in the 1960s from the worst of 
ideological, thermonuclear confrontation to the beginnings of those policies and 
events that finally ended the Cold War:  the united strategy of deterrence and 
détente.31  The consolidation of German democracy reached a stage in this decade 
where one could see that the republic would not likely suffer the fate of its 
predecessor.  The social and political cleavages that had been so obvious from 
the end of the 19th century until 1933 became a thing of the past or got 
catapulted across the iron curtain into the German-German struggle over the 
ideal form of state and society.  To be sure, the decade witnessed political and 
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social stresses, especially in its latter half, but these phenomena differed in their 
essence and effect from those of thirty years earlier.  
 At the same time, a younger generation of Germans partook of the spirit 
of the age in the Euro-Atlantic realm and questioned authority on all fronts.32  
This phenomenon gained much energy from the political fatigue of the founders 
of 1949 and from the rise of the New Left in West Germany, a trend that began 
after the SPD abandoned Marxism and embraced Atlanticisim at the start of the 
1960s.  Not the least subject of revolt against the old order lay in what one’s 
parents had done in the years 1933-45 as well as in the first years of the FRG.  In 
this regard, the role of the common man and woman in national socialism, and 
by implication that of the common soldier in the Wehrmacht likewise became the 
topic of debate.  Thus did the policy of democratic inclusion circa 1948-53, which 
sought to refute the re-educators and the Nuremberg verdicts, eventually bow 
before a new, more powerful dynamism of German civil society that made an 
ever more acute, and focused Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung (mastery of the past) 
an unceasing feature of contemporary political culture.  In all the above, events 
outside of Germany routinely intermeshed with developments of society and 
ideas within the country. 
  The arrest in Argentina of ex-SS Obersturmbannfuehrer (LTC) Adolf 
Eichmann and his subsequent trial in Israel (1960-62) returned to public 
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consciousness the mass murder of European Jewry in Hitler’s New Order.33  
Perhaps the public mind had repressed the re-educators’ and de-nazifiers’ film 
documentaries of the death camps and found its mental equilibrium with the 
legend that the allied bombings symbolized a crime just as heinous as 
Auschwitz.  But now this collective memory slowly began to shake off public 
amnesia and became unhinged by the behavior of the man in the glass booth. 
Hannah Arendt’s thesis of the banality of evil when applied to Eichmann’s 
biography highlighted the fate of the rank and file in national socialism, a trend 
that only gathered force as time passed.  The trial in Jerusalem was followed in 
1964-65 by the debate in parliament about the statute of limitations for crimes 
committed under national socialism and by the trial of yet more Nazi rank and 
file in the guise of SS guard personnel from the Auschwitz camp, the largest trial 
of its kind in the FRG until then.   
  At the same time, the return of captured military records from the United 
States and the United Kingdom to Germany strengthened the interest of German 
language scholarship for the civil-military structures of Nazi Germany.  Such 
historians as Klaus-Juergen Mueller and Manfred Messerschmidt corrected the 
tendentious image of the Wehrmacht in national socialism that had been offered 
by apologists, memoirists, military pamphleteers and nationalist politicians in 
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the early 1950s.34  The pioneering works of these men were followed in turn by 
scores of monographs and studies that uncovered a high degree of culpability on 
the part of the senior military leadership in the crimes of national socialism as 
well as the exploration of new vistas concerning the nature of ideological war in 
the machine age and the twisted road to Auschwitz.  Yet, at first, this scholarship 
had little impact on the public mind and remained unnoticed.   
 Change during the middle and later 1960s in the international realm 
altered considerably popular understanding of contemporary history and the 
image of the soldier and the state in German democracy.35  The new eastern 
policies of the Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Wily Brandt cabinets brought relaxed 
tensions with the Warsaw Pact, which coincided with the steady disillusionment 
among the German left with the exemplary image of US state and society due to 
the Indo-China War.  In all of this, the Bundeswehr formed a welcome target for 
criticism of the Bonn Republic and its tenets of capitalism, consumerism and 
nuclear Atlanticisim.  If the Cold War were on the wane, why then have an army 
at all?  And, moreover, why maintain an army that was a knock-off of the 
murderous Americans, whose race wars in the cities of North America and 
air/land war against the Vietnamese now put the lie to years of re-education?  
Matters were made no easier by enduring strain in German civil-military 
relations that ebbed and flowed throughout the decade in abuses of recruits in a 
paratroop regiment (1963), fights over the role of parliamentary oversight (1964), 
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procurement scandals (1966), tensions between senior ministerial figures and 
high-ranking generals (1966), and a series of civil-military battles over the theory 
and practice of Innere Fuehrung (1968-71).  The image of the Wehrmacht as well 
as that of the Reichswehr was seldom more than a subsidiary issue during the 
late-1960s.  However, in such events as the controversial speech of Army Vice 
Chief of Staff Hans-Hellmuth Grashey wherein he described Innere Fuehrung as 
but a “mask,” in the so-called Schnez Study (named for Army Chief of Staff 
Albert Schnez) which called for a reform of society to increase combat power, 
and in the series of conflicting semi-public statements about the image of the 
officer (“Lieutenant ‘70,” and “Captains of Unna”), the image of the Wehrmacht 
lay pretty close to the surface.  These now forgotten incidents allowed critics to 
conclude that traditionalist Wehrmacht veterans in Bundeswehr uniform were 
marching toward right-wing veterans organizations in the hope of returning 
some of the aggressive elan and dash of the old army to the utilitarian, drab 
army-in-a-democracy.36 
  This description of politics, society, and civil-military relations forms a 
backdrop to the rise of the social liberal coalition at the end of the 1960s.  The 
above factors also played a role in German civil-military relations in the 1970s.  
This decade formed the pivotal age between now and then, that is, between the 
mentality and world view that held sway forty years ago and that of today.  
From late-1976 until late-1982, then, the Cold War compromise about the 
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Wehrmacht, that is, the contrarian view of the soldier in national socialism in 
West German society, came undone as the cold war itself moved into its final 
phases.  Just as at end of the 1990s, when disputes of policy about world and 
national economy, society and ecology led to conflict in a socialist-led coalition, 
in a not dissimilar way socialists grappled with questions of statecraft, 
diplomacy, strategy and alliance policy in what proved to be the climactic epoch 
of the Cold War (1977-87).37  The latter issues of policy concerning Germany’s 
role in NATO strategy tore rifts in the ranks of the socialist government at the 
national and local level.  This phenomenon eventually undid the policy on 
soldierly tradition of the Adenauer era while it also weakened the cabinet of 
Helmut Schmidt.  The image of the Wehrmacht became ensnared in German 
civil-military relations which were rather more concerned with nuclear strategy 
in NATO than principally with the fate of an unreconstructed, highly decorated 
veteran.  
 The visit in the fall of 1976 of the Stuka ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel to a 
veterans association meeting at an air force base near Freiburg im Breisgau set off 
a debate about the role of the Wehrmacht that unfolded in the Bundeswehr, in 
the cabinet, in the Socialist Party, and among the Christian Democratic 
opposition.38  In one form or another, this struggle lasted for six years, and might 
be said, in fact, never to have ceased at all.  Critics of the maintenance of tradition 
in the Bundeswehr objected to all symbolic and personal connections with the 
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Wehrmacht.39  The willingness among makers of policy in the 1950s and early 
1960s to allow certain continuities and contacts with the old armies gave way to a 
bureaucratic tendency to draw ever-sharper historical and ethical barriers to the 
world before 1945.  The Rudel scandal and the following debate pitted such 
critics against a defensive minority, who were oriented to the mission of the 
soldier in combat, and who asserted that one should be able to honor soldierly 
bravery in abstraction from an army’s political purpose.  Such distinctions, which 
might have been palatable in the depths of the Cold War as a reaction against re-
education and Nuremberg, now became ever less so to a civil society that saw 
contemporary history in a different light.  
 The end of the decade witnessed a boom of interest in the German past, a 
feature of civil society that had not been present in early years of the Federal 
Republic.  To the surprise and perhaps dismay of some professors, historical 
exhibitions, publications and history-from-below projects spread across the West 
German landscape.  As the 1970s ended, the past also rushed in the form of 
political strife at home and abroad.  This combination of interest in history and 
political upheaval gave strength to critics of the Bundeswehr and put those who 
honored the memory of the Wehrmacht and its soldiers onto shaky political 
ground.  Whatever its merits in fact, the scandal of 1979 about the wartime naval 
service of then Minister President of Baden-Wuertemberg, Hans Georg Filbinger, 
appeared to highlight the brutalities of give-no-quarter discipline for the average 
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Wehrmacht soldier once the war was lost.  The broadcast in the same year of an 
American “mini-series” about the fate of victims and perpetrators of what now 
generally came to be called the “Holocaust,” galvanized public interest in this 
most aggressive and essential aspect of the Nazi regime.  This television series 
thrust the “final solution” into the public mind to an extent far beyond the breach 
worked by Eichmann’s trial in the early 1960s.  Here the evils of pseudo-scientific 
mass murder and ethnic cleansing have remained ever since within the general 
phenomenon of Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung. Indeed, the last remnants of 
public amnesia gave way to heightened consciousness of repressed memories.  
Auschwitz presently became an omnipresent political symbol for more than 
merely the events that led the anti-Jewish boycott of 1933 to the Wannsee 
Conference of 1942 and beyond to the gas chambers and crematoria.  A nuclear 
Auschwitz for all of Europe was in the offing because of a NATO strategy of 
armament with intermediate nuclear missiles.  This image became an idee fixe of 
the German peace movement from 1979 until 1983, who, as in earlier phases, 
took aim at the image of the soldier in the Bundeswehr.  In particular, the 
maintenance of tradition and it symbols and ceremonies came in for protest.  In 
1980-81, violent opponents of the socialist government and its foreign policy 
seized upon public swearings of the oath to advance their political goals via 
episodes of violence staged before the mass media.  
 The projectiles hurled at soldiers swearing their solemn oath on city 
squares demolished whatever was left of the contrarian image of the Wehrmacht 
 28
in the policy of the West German military.  In response, the socialist government 
abandoned the policy on military tradition put forward a decade and a half 
earlier and proscribed symbolic and institutional links of any kind with the 
Wehrmacht.  The 1982 guidelines on military tradition, which were among the 
final acts of socialist Hans Apel’s defense ministry, brought a climax to the 
political struggle about the image of the Wehrmacht that broke out in late-1976 
with the Rudel scandal.  As such, the senior defense leadership junked earlier 
policy, whose origins lay in the first years of the Federal Republic and its new 
army.  The debate circa 1976-82 was surely as much about German civil-military 
relations in the midst of the last Cold War missile crisis as it was about Rudel’s 
biography and the swearing of the oath.  At the same time, this struggle was also 
connected with the bi-polarities of pacifism and anti-military sentiment among 
socialists in conflict with the obligations of the Helmut Schmidt government to 
maintain Atlantic alliance solidarity and to take account of the needs of military 
professionalism in a democracy.  The events of the early-1980s, however, were 
but a prelude to yet further incidents and debate that have continued to the close 
of the decade and the end of the century.40 
 
Some Thoughts on the Image of the Wehrmacht in the 1990s 
   In the year since, there unfolded further episodes wherein the semi-
criminal nature of the leadership of the Wehrmacht or of its soldiers generally 
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became an issue:  the 1985 controversy about President Ronald Reagan honoring 
Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS dead at Bitburg; the 1986-87 question of President 
Kurt Waldheim’s service while an intelligence officer in the Balkans; the writings 
of the late- Professor Andreas Hillgruber about the defensive battles against the 
Red Army in the last stages of the war that became co-mingled with the 
controversial ideas of Ernst Nolte in the so-called “Historikerstreit.” of 1986-88.41  
For anyone who had reflected on the foregoing, one found a familiar set of 
arguments pro and contra as regards the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, the nature 
of military professionalism, the limits of soldierly obedience, the honoring of 
martial virtues and the criminal acts of soldiers and national socialists.  
 In the interval, the world historical changes of the year 1989 have given 
new energy to this traditional debate of Federal German politics.  Momentous 
alterations in politics and society naturally must increase interest in a literate 
public about the meaning of the past.  The collapse of the Soviet system and the 
revival of actual war in Europe and nearby, in which organized violence for 
political ends of an especially brutal kind surprised and confused makers of 
policy, touched the German public mind very differently than did the events of 
fifty-five years ago.  Germany must now come to grips with the experience of the 
German Democratic Republic as well as that of the Third Reich.  One must do so 
as the waning years of the century have turned violent.  This extraordinary series 
of events has coincided with a general trend in the western world to see the 
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Holocaust, as a far more central aspect of national socialism and the Second 
World War than had been the case in previous years.  The enthusiastic popular 
reception in Germany of Stephen Spielberg’s film of 1993 Schindler’s List and of 
Daniel Goldhagen’s volume of 1996 on German popular race hatred and the 
murder of Jews speaks to this trend.42  The foregoing overshadowed debate as to 
why certain Bundeswehr barracks are named for former soldiers, who by 
modern criteria, have an unacceptable political reputation.  Events in the Balkans 
and in the realm of memory dominated by Auschwitz also overwhelmed the 
discussions of 1994 and 1995 of how to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of 
the 20 July 1944 attempt to kill Hitler and the fiftieth anniversary of war’s end.  
  Daniel Goldhagen’s reductionist thesis of a uniquely German form of 
anti-Jewish blood lust, with which this writer disagrees, relies chiefly on the 
murderous progress of  para-military formations of the Ordnungspolizei (Order 
Police) seconded by the Reichsfuehrer SS to cleanse ethnically  rear areas of the 
eastern front.43  In part, just as much as Goldhagen uses the work of other 
scholars of the Holocaust, he also builds on a body of historical scholarship that 
has followed the lead of John Keegan to examine the face of battle from the 
soldier’s perspective.44  Historical evidence that underscores the effects of 
political indoctrination as well as the ideological contents of soldiers’ letters have 
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further damaged the image soldier of the Wehrmacht that arose as a protest 
against re-education and the Nuremberg verdicts.45  One might also observe that 
the search for the historical truth is poorly served when political pressure groups 
of any kind--particularly extremists--seize upon the soldier’s honor as a political 
weapon.  Such a move has often politicized soldiers and damaged their 
professional competence to the loss of all. 
 To be sure, the present debate also arises naturally from civil-military 
tensions in a united Germany, where German armed forces imbedded within a 
Euro-Atlantic framework face new tasks and missions quite different from the 
strategic world of the 1970s.46  Just as events connected with diplomacy and 
strategy acted as a factor for and against the honor of the Wehrmacht and its 
soldiers in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, this dynamic is alive in the 1990s.  The 
interpretation of the image of the Wehrmacht in the Bundeswehr now stands in 
the shadow of the Gulf War, the Somalian intervention, and the war in ex-
Yugoslavia.47  Discussion about war and soldiers leads one back to the 
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Wehrmacht in the Balkans and forward to the NATO Stabilization Force in 
Bosnia and the Kosovo Force in Kosovo. As such this knotted set of issues exists 
within a continuum, where those anxious about strategy and armies in a 
democracy use the past to speak of present tensions about the soldier and the 
state in Germany.  Few seem to keep the foregoing insight in mind, however, 
because of the ignorance of how past and present events are connected in the 
history of ideas in their dimension present in democratic civil-military relations. 
 All public discussion about the image of the Wehrmacht, of which the 
exhibition on the crimes of the Wehrmacht is a noteworthy example, stands in 
this continuity of debate.  This writer finds many of the arguments vital at the 
end of the present decade to be overdrawn; this being said, however, this subject 
has always tended toward extremes because of how debates about the past and 
the soldier in the state have generally had a polarizing effect in Germany.  Such 
civil-military exchange has become the hallmark of a sound, effective German 
democracy in which Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung remains a controversial, but 
central feature.  This most recent phase of contention surely has gained gravity 
from how the end of the Cold War era has accelerated the pace of political and 
social change in central Europe.  The onset of the new era has thrown open to 
public scrutiny practically the whole record of mass politics, war in the machine 
                                                                                                                                                 
1990s is:  Klaus Naumann,  Die Bundeswehr in einer Welt im Umbruch (Berlin, 1994); of further interest 
by, and for German soldiers, are these volumes on civil-military relations of the 1990s:   Joachim Weber, 
ed.  Armee in Kreuzfeuer (Munich, 1997); Heinz Karst, Die Bundeswehr in der Krise (Munich, 1997); Gerd 
Schultze-Rhondorf, Wozu Noch Tapfer Sein? (Graefeling, 1998); Domink A. Faust,  Vetrauenskrise in der 
Bundeswehr (Graefeling, 1998), an insightful monograph on German security, defense and civil-military 
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age, and genocide in the 20th century.  The sudden and unexpected unification of 
Germany and the reorganization of the European system of states have 
heightened and sharpened many of the trends and phenomena identified above 
in this essay.  The sense that things are in flux gives greater urgency to the desire 
to understand the causes and effects of catastrophic events.  Each generation will 
take the evidence of the past and re-arrange such material in a new, and, in this 
case, perhaps more critical light.  Such a process is inevitable; plainly, German 
democracy would be a much worse place without such a phenomenon.  Younger 
generations of Germans, wholly untouched by nearly all of what has been 
described here, are now free to reflect upon the perpetual dilemma of the soldier 
and politics represented by the studio portrait of a young recruit and by the snap 
shots he made of war’s genocidal brutalities.  
                                                                                                                                                 
relations as seldom offered by an American is:  John Duffield,  World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, 
International Institutions and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford, 1998).   
